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ABSTRACT: 
Nietzsche’s famous claim, ‘das Thun ist Alles’, is usually translated as ‘the deed is everything’. I 
argue that it is better rendered as ‘the doing is everything’. Accordingly, I propose a processual 
reading of agency in GM 1 13 which draws both on Nietzsche’s reflections on grammar, and on 
the Greek middle voice, to displace the opposition between deeds and events, agents and patients 
by introducing the notion of middle-voiced ‘doings’. The relevant question then is not ‘is this a 
doing or a happening?’ but ‘what is the process unfolding in the doer, and what is her engagement 
with it?’. I argue (a) that this middle voiced reading makes better sense than either naturalist or 
expressivist interpretations of the key thought in GM 1 13 that ‘there is no doer behind the doing’, 
and (b) that GM 1 13 does not only provide us with a critique of slave morality, as is often said, but 
also with an example of a middle-voiced doing: self-deception. I explore the phenomenology of 
middle-voiced doings in other passages and show that it has at least three features: (pre-)reflective 
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 Those who seek to characterise Nietzsche’s views on agency tend to fall into two camps: 
naturalists1 usually start from the agent’s drives, and expressivists, from the agent’s deeds. 
Nietzsche’s famous claim in GM I 13, ‘das Thun ist Alles’, is taken as support for expressivist 
readings and translated as ‘the deed is everything’ (as in the title of Ridley (2018)). I argue below 
that Nietzsche’s choice of ‘Thun’ (rather than, say, other action nouns such as ‘Handlung’ or ‘Tat’), 
in conjunction with the use of  processual terms (in particular ‘wirken’ (effecting) and ‘werden’ 
(becoming)), warrants translating ‘das Thun is Alles’ as ‘the doing is everything’. I further argue 
that if the doing really is everything, then at least in some cases (including GM I 13) agency is best 
understood, not as an intentional process carried out by a doer (a view which already underlies 
expressivist interpretations and is compatible with non-eliminativist naturalist readings), but from 
the perspective of the doing itself, as a response to an internal process the agent finds herself 
                                                     
NB: I am grateful to the members of the 2019 meeting of the International Society for Nietzsche Studies, in 
particular Brian Leiter and Jessica Berry, for their questions and comments. Thanks also to David Batho, 
Thomas Khurana, Wayne Martin, Robert Stern and Dan Watts.  
 
1 By ‘naturalists’ I refer to a set of Nietzschean interpreters who self-identify in this way (e.g. K. Gemes, P. 
Katsafanas, B. Leiter, B. Reginster or J. Richardson amongst others). I do not make any claim about 
naturalism in general.  
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engaged with. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘one should take the doer back into the doing [Thun] after 
having conceptually removed the doer and thus emptied the doing; and one should take (...) the 
‘aim’, the ‘intention’, the ‘purpose’, back into the doing after having artificially removed all this 
and thus emptied the doing’ (WP [675] (1887-1888) tr. modified). If we are to understand certain 
exercises of agency, we must start in medias res: not prospectively, from the perspective of the 
agent setting out to carry out her intentions, nor retrospectively, from the perspective of the deed 
as allowing us to identify which intentions were expressed (and what they say about the agent). 
Equally, we must work from the doing itself to characterise what counts as being a doer. We 
cannot assume the primacy of intention (expressive or not) to understand agency, nor - as is 
implicitly conveyed by the etymology of the word ‘agent’2 - that being a doer always consists in 
having the ability to initiate an action. But given how ingrained these assumptions have become, 
how can we do this?  
 I take my lead from Nietzsche’s frequent admonitions (including in GM I 13) against the ways 
in which our understanding of agency is shaped by grammar, in particular by the two following 
features. The first is voice (‘diathesis’). The grammatical voice marks the relationship between the 
action (or state) expressed by the verb on the one hand, and the grammatical subject on the other. 
Most modern Indo-European languages have two voices, active and passive. As is well known, 
Nietzsche is deeply suspicious of the ways in which voice shapes our understanding of agency: 
‘people are following grammatical habits here in drawing conclusions, reasoning that “thinking is 
an activity, behind every activity something is active –‘ (BGE: 17). The second feature, also specific 
to Indo-European languages, is the fact that ‘the verb only refers to the subject. (...) Everything is 
ordered and presented around the subject’ (Benvéniste (1966): 169, my translation). This inbuilt 
reference is marked by the declension of the verb, which indicates person and number. Nietzsche 
picks up on this grammatical feature by complaining about ‘our grammatical custom that adds a 
doer to every doing [Thun]’ (WP [484], tr. modified). Or in the published work: ‘even the “it” 
[grammatical subject of ‘it thinks’] contains an interpretation of the process and does not belong to 
the process itself (BGE 17, Nietzsche’s italics. See also WP [549] (1885)). 
 If we are trapped by our ‘faith in grammar’ (BGE 34) into thinking that ‘every activity 
presupposes an agent’ (WP 550 (1885-1886)), then perhaps a good way of illuminating the idea 
that ‘the doing is everything’ is to have recourse to a different grammar, one which Nietzsche 
                                                     
2 ‘Agere’ is notorious for having many meanings but its primary signification, and the root of all subsidiaries 
(including ‘to do’), is ‘to set in motion’. For this reason, I shall refrain from using the word ‘agent’ when 
presenting my own reading of GM I 13, preferring the more neutral ‘doer’ instead. 
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knew very well: ancient Greek. This is in keeping with the genealogical spirit: investigating a past 
practice so as to gain more distance from, and a better understanding of, our current grammatical 
practice. A distinctive feature of ancient Greek is that it included a third voice, the ‘middle voice’.3 
The reason why the middle voice may help us to rethink agency from the doing, rather than from 
the doer or the deed, is that in ancient Greek the use of the middle, firstly, marks the action 
expressed by the verb as processual and, secondly, indicates an internal relation of the subject to 
the process: it puts the doer ‘back in the doing’. As Benvéniste says, ‘in the middle (...) the verb 
indicates a process of which the subject is the locus [siège]; the subject is internal to the process. 
(...) He accomplishes something which accomplishes itself in him’ (1966: 172).  
 In section I, I characterise the conception of the agent operative in naturalist readings of 
Nietzsche as broadly Humean and argue that if one starts from this conception, then GM I 13 
reads as a manifesto for eliminativism about agency. I briefly point out the difficulties, textual and 
otherwise, of such a reading and turn in section II to expressivist interpretations of GM I 13. I 
argue that expressivists too are faced with textual and theoretical difficulties, in particular because 
they implicitly fall back on the broadly Humean understanding of action. In section III I discuss 
translation issues and suggest that in the case of GM I 13 what the weak do is best understood 
from the perspective of the process which unfolds in them (the ‘smouldering of hatred and 
revenge’). In section IV I turn to the middle voice to explore this thought further and apply my 
findings to GM I 13. This sheds a different light on the passage by allowing it to be read, not 
simply as an attack on the creation of new values by the weak (a common reading), but as 
highlighting the peculiar exercise of agency which made such creation possible: self-deception as a 
middle-voiced doing. For all its importance in GM, however, self-deception is only one instance of 
middle-voiced doings. In the last section, I examine two passages written by Nietzsche about 
himself (EH, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’, §3 and GS, Second Preface: 5) in order to bring out key 
aspects of the phenomenology of middle-voiced doings. 
 Two methodological provisos: firstly, there is a relative mismatch between the ideas that this 
paper develops and the medium used for this purpose. I cannot write in the middle voice: in a 
non-negligible sense, I am writing against the very grammar I use. This is unavoidable but perhaps 
not without consequences on my ability to communicate what I seek to convey (I mean this in an 
observational, not exculpatory, manner). Secondly, my aim in this paper is not to attribute to 
                                                     
3 A caveat: in what follows I speak of ‘the’ middle voice as if it was a simple and univocal concept. In this, I 
follow Benvéniste’s and Gonda’s attempts to draw out the most important characteristics of the middle 
voice. But there are many subdivisions regarding the middle (e.g. reflexive, eventive, dative, etc.). For a 
detailed study, see Kemmer (1993).  
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Nietzsche a general theory of agency as middle-voiced, but rather to suggest that there are 
important phenomena in human life which are more complex with respect to agency than either 
naturalist or expressivist views can accommodate on their own. 
 
STARTING FROM THE AGENT’S DRIVES: NATURALIST READINGS OF GM I 13 
 Naturalist readers do not start from the agent in the sense of the rationalist tradition, for 
which to be an agent is to have the ability to initiate an action for reasons deemed capable of 
suspending motives and which are transparently available to the agent, either at the time of the 
action or retrospectively. Most naturalist interpreters start from Nietzsche’s psychology of drives. 
In a nutshell, drives are non-conscious dispositions which generate affective orientations and 
motivate human comportment. Drives take a two-part complement, having both an aim (a 
characteristic form of activity) and an object (an occasional end which will allow the temporary 
discharge of the drive). Drives compete with each other and an individual’s comportment results 
from a particular (often temporary) ordering of the drives, which motivates her to seek certain 
ends rather than others. For example, a hungry individual in whom the sexual drive is dominant 
will typically ignore her hunger to seek new partners for sexual intercourse. The psychology of 
drives is used to illuminate Nietzsche’s claims about the will to power. According to B. Reginster, 
to will power is to will ‘the very activity of overcoming resistance’ (2008: 127). As with any drive, 
the will to power expresses its characteristic activity (overcoming resistance) by motivating the 
individual to seek first-order ends which will afford maximum resistance (Reginster’s typical 
examples are sports and games), the main role of deliberation being to determine the best means to 
overcome such resistance. 
 What emerges here is a broadly Humean picture of agency: the psychology involved is much 
more complex than Hume’s own distinction between passions as motivational power on the one 
hand, and instrumental reason on the other. But it is Humean still, because the structure of the 
two accounts is very similar. Drives and affects motivate individuals to achieve certain (first order) 
ends, with deliberation and reflection playing a mostly ancillary role when the pursuit of these 
ends is intentional (as opposed to resulting sub-personally from the drives).4 In the former case, 
individuals cause the action by carrying out the intentions that arise from the combination of their 
motives and instrumental considerations.  
                                                     
4 On Katsafanas’ ‘vector’ model of the will, deliberation can influence action by providing further motives. 
However it cannot suspend motives, nor initiate (‘trigger’) action on its own.  
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 A common complaint against Humean approaches is that rather than taking agency as a 
power of the agent, they reduce agency to a play of pro-attitudes in the agent. Katsafanas 
implicitly endorses this concern by pointing out that in many cases an agent’s comportment may 
only count as ‘mere behaviour’ (an echo of Velleman’s (2000) notion of ‘mere activity’) because 
the agent is simply a vessel for her drives (see also Gemes 2009: 42: a ‘passive conduit for disparate 
forces’). The worry is that a merely Humean approach to agency will result, paradoxically, in 
eliminativism about the agent. Some interpreters, such as B. Leiter, are happy to endorse this 
position. Others introduce what might be called a ‘selfhood’ clause on agency: intentions must 
arise from a ‘self’ as an ‘enduring coordinated hierarchy of drives’ (Gemes 2009: 46). For example, 
‘sovereign’ individuals will only form intentions that are secondary in the sense that they follow 
an initial resistance to external stimuli. Conversely, such agents are capable of binding themselves 
to the carrying out of their intentions in a much tighter way: they have the capacity to ‘promise’. 
In such cases, the agent and her drives serve as a starting point to think of action in the more 
robust sense that only selves are capable of true action, as opposed to ‘mere behaviour’.  
 Thinking agency from the perspective of the agent, however, does not sit well with the claims 
in GM I 13 that ‘there is not ‘being’ behind the deed’ or that the ‘doer is invented as an 
afterthought’. If these claims were meant to target solely the rationalist conception of the agent 
opposed by naturalists (and by Nietzsche himself) there would, of course, be no difficulty. But 
Nietzsche’s sweeping reference in GM I 13 to ‘the seduction of language and the fundamental 
errors of reason petrified in it’ suggests that this is not the case. The error is not to construe the 
agent as endowed with free will but to ‘construe and misconstrue all effecting (Wirken) as 
conditional on an “effecter” (Wirkendes). As I mentioned earlier, it is a structural feature of Indo-
European languages that verbal forms bear a reference to the grammatical subject (e.g. ‘cogito’, 
‘[lightning] flashes’). Accordingly, the error of the ‘common people’, who see that lightning flashes 
and make a ‘doing a deed’ out of it, is largely induced by grammar.5 The grammatical subject 
(lightning) becomes reified into an entity which pre-exists the deed (the flash) and serves as its 
explanans: the agent is ‘behind’ the deed in the sense that s/he causes it. As Nietzsche puts it, we 
(mistakenly) believe that ‘every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer’ (WP [550] 
(1885-1886)). But (on this line of interpretation) lightning just is the flash. Correlatively, the 
correct conclusion is to reject the distinction between event and deed and to hold that there are 
                                                     
5 It also has psychological origins in bodily perception: ‘the oldest and most enduring psychology was at 
work here, doing absolutely nothing but this: it considered all events to be deeds, all deeds to be the result 
of a will, (...) a doer (‘subject’) pushed its way under all events’ (TI: 178); see also WP 47 (1885-1886)). 
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only events (which our unavoidable use of grammar continually pushes us to misconstrue as 
deeds).  
 Paradoxically, the most straightforward interpretation of GM 1 13 is the very eliminativism 
that many naturalist readers of Nietzsche on agency seek to avoid by developing their broadly 
Humean assumptions into a more robust conception of the agent as a unified self. This 
eliminativist line, however, is not without its difficulties. Perhaps the most developed criticism is 
R. Pippin’s. Textually, it is not as easy to read the strong (Starken) out of strength expressing itself 
as it is to read lightning out of the flash: ‘the language of doer-deed is not dropped. A strong 
person’s strength is expressed in a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, to become master’ 
(Pippin 2015: 223, his italics). Pippin’s broader argument takes the form of a reductio: without our 
being entitled to give them ‘psychological meaning’ by attributing them to the strong, the various 
‘bodily movements’ involved in such activities (‘overcoming’ etc.) would be unintelligible, and 
indistinguishable from similar random bodily movements. More generally, on Pippin’s view the 
whole genealogical attack on Christian morality would become non-sensical because it ‘appears to 
rely on a traditional understanding of act descriptions (that the act is individuated as an act mainly 
by reference to the agent's intentions), and [Nietzsche] invokes a complex picture of unconscious 
motives, operative and motivating, but inaccessible as such to the agents involved’ (Pippin 2006: 
137).6  
 Given this, expressivists follow Pippin in adopting a different strategy: rather than 
presupposing a doer as the cause of the deed, they start from the deed in order to understand the 
doer’s intentions. The claim that becomes central, then, is the idea that ‘the deed is everything’.   
 
STARTING FROM THE DEED: EXPRESSIVIST READINGS OF GM I 13.  
 Expressivist interpretations of GM I 13 rely mainly on two claims: (a) expressive intentions 
cannot be specified prior to the action and (b) the relation between intentions and deeds is not 
causal but expressive. Regarding (a), Ridley sets up a contrast between what he calls ‘basic’ and 
‘expressive’ actions. Basic actions are such that their ‘conditions of success can be non-trivially 
specified independently and in advance of any attempt to meet them’ (2018: 38). Ridley’s 
                                                     
6 Eliminativists may object that individuating acts by reference to the agent’s intentions is merely a 
retrospective fiction and that actions are best characterised as patterns of behaviour. However, the presence 
of such patterns cannot by itself count as evidence of agency: sunflowers regularly follow the sun. Unless 
eliminativists want to give up on the vocabulary of agency altogether, they are faced with the difficulty of 
accounting for agency without agents. For my part, I seek to account for certain instances of agency in 
Nietzsche by reference to middle-voiced ‘doers’ rather than ‘agents’.  
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recurring example is making a cup of coffee. Basic actions rely on a model of agency very similar 
(if not identical, see further down) to the broadly Humean model examined above: the intentions 
involved are prospective and play a causal role in the genesis of the action. Basic actions are 
common; by contrast, expressive actions are fairly rare. They are characterised by the fact that the 
conditions of success of realisation of the intention are not specified in advance of such intention 
being realised in the deed.7 Artistic creation is taken as a paradigm of expressive action because an 
artist cannot specify in advance what the work will look like, nor what its conditions of success 
will be. Ridley also gives examples from everyday life: if I am looking for a word, I won’t know 
what the correct word is until I have found it (Wittgenstein). The intention ‘comes into a kind of 
focus’ in the finding of the word (2018: 42).  
 Regarding (b), since a cause must precede its effects the fact that our expressive intentions do 
not pre-exist our deeds entails that the appropriate relation between intention and deed should 
not be understood as causal. As Pippin puts it, ‘“expressivism” is a claim that shares an assumption 
with all accounts of actions as such— that there are bodily movements or mental happenings that 
stand in a relation to a subject’s mindedness— and it argues for a kind of relation different from all 
causal, compatibilist and voluntarist, free- will accounts’ (2006: 233). Ridley (2018: 31) develops 
the claim by stating that the relation between intention and deed is a relation of mutual 
constitution whereby both come into existence together. In the example borrowed from 
Wittgenstein, the intention is specified in the finding of the right word. Conversely, it is the 
presence of this expressed intention which makes the finding of the word an action (rather than, 
say, a case of Tourette syndrome).  
 To return to GM I 13, on an expressivist reading the doer is not ‘behind the deed’ because qua 
doer s/he does not operate as a cause. The agent’s intentions (in the expressive sense) do not pre-
exist the deed but can only be discovered in it retrospectively: the deed, as the expression of the 
inner in the outer, is ‘everything’.   
 There are, however, difficulties with this line of interpretation too, both textual and 
theoretical. Textually, the problem is the converse of the one encountered by eliminativism: while 
the example of strength seems to bring grist to the expressivist mill, the case of the flash is harder 
to make sense of. Pippin states that ‘we cannot say that the flash is just an electrical discharge in 
the air. Clearly, a certain sort of meteorological event is “expressed”’ (2010: 88). Note the 
                                                     
7 Such conditions of success cannot be fixed in reference to the agent’s expressed intention only: they are 
also dependent on an existing context of social norms and practices, and the agent’s own understanding of 
her intentions has no epistemic privilege. 
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quotation marks, which could be taken as a give-away of Pippin’s unease about the applicability of 
expressivism to the flash of lightning. The argument given is that a phenomenally identical ‘flash’ 
could be artificially produced, without it being lightning: thus the ‘distinctness of the flash 
depends on what it is expressing’ (Pippin’s italics). Yet the argument does not seem very 
convincing. Assuming that it is possible to produce a flash identical to that of lightning in artificial 
conditions (which may be difficult given the scale involved), presumably the most natural way to 
account for the difference would be to say that lightning is a natural electrical discharge (vs one 
artificially produced), not that the flash ‘expresses’ lightning.   
 But there is a deeper problem: in spite of having introduced a ‘technical’ concept of intention, 
expressivism still relies on the presence of intentions in the sense of the broadly Humean model. 
We can call such intentions ‘framing intentions’: while fairly indeterminate, they serve as a 
starting point for the carrying out of the relevant action. Ridley’s would-be writer begins ‘with a 
description of what he is after: “I want a word that means, roughly, such and such”’ (2018: 42). A 
little further down, Ridley states that ‘in the cases that I have mentioned the agent would have no 
difficulty in declaring his intention: ‘I’m trying to find the right word’, he might say (2018: 43). 
Ridley continues in expressivist spirit by saying that ‘what he cannot do is specify in advance just 
which word that is’. The fact that its conditions of success cannot be specified in advance is what 
makes the action the particular action it is (a ‘certain thing’ rather than ‘a thing of a certain kind’ 
2018: 42). But what makes the action an action is that it is the carrying out of the framing 
intention of finding the right word, even if the modality of such carrying out is not determinate at 
the time. This implicit reliance on the broadly Humean model of agency is confirmed by Ridley’s 
explicit endorsement of Reginster’s interpretation of the will to power,8  which he uses to re-
describe expressivist actions: ‘expressive undertakings are a subset of the class of ‘challenging 
things’ and are hence amongst the most natural of appropriate candidates, when an agent has a 
first-order desire to engage in them, to provide the will to power with determinate content’ (2018: 
127). So, there would be no ‘expressivist undertaking’ without a ‘first-order desire’ from which the 
relevant intention(s) arise(s): if this is true, then even the expressivist agent stands in a causal 
relation to her action, in which case it would seem that the deed is not everything and that there 
is, after all, a doer behind the deed.   
 
                                                     
8 ‘The details of Reginster’s defence of this interpretation are absorbing (...). Here, though, I propose simply 
to accept what he says, and to regard the will to power as the will to confront challenges—and prevail’ 
(2018: 124).  
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‘THE DOING IS EVERYTHING’.  
 GM I 13 thus presents us with a dilemma between eliminativism and expressivism: either we 
give up on the event/deed distinction, at the risk of failing to make sense of agency, or we endorse 
it at the cost of failing to do justice to the thought that ‘the deed is everything’. I propose that 
closer attention to the use of processual verbs and nouns in the text may afford us a way forward.  
 
It is just as absurd to ask strength not to express itself as strength, not to be a desire to 
overthrow, crush, become master, to be a thirst for enemies, resistance and triumphs, as it is 
to ask weakness to express itself as strength. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of 
drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but this driving, willing and effecting [Wirken] and 
only the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), 
which construes and misconstrues all effecting as conditional on an effecter [Wirkendes], a 
‘subject’, can make it appear otherwise. And just as the common people separates lightning 
from its flash and takes the latter to be a doing, the effect [Wirkung] of a subject, which is 
called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as 
though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong which had the freedom to 
manifest strength or not. But there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the 
doing, effecting, becoming [Thun, Wirken, Werden] ‘the doer’ is added to the doing as an 
afterthought, – the doing is everything. Basically, the common people double a doing; when 
they see lightning, they make a doing-doing [Thun-Thun] out of it: they posit the same 
happening [Geschehen], first as cause and then as its effect.  
GM I 13, Nietzsche’s italics, amendments in bold. 
  
 Without wanting to make too much of translation issues, ‘doing’ seems a better translation for 
the key word ‘Thun’ than ‘deed’.9 Duden defines ‘Thun’ as ‘jemandes Ausführung einer Handlung, 
Beschäftigung mit etwas’: the carrying out (Ausführung) of an action, being occupied (beschäftig) 
with something. In everyday German, the question ‘was tut er denn da?’ (‘what is he doing?’) 
suggests that the onlooker is witnessing an ongoing process without being sure what the action is. 
Both the dictionary and common use emphasise the ongoing, imperfective aspect of ‘Thun’ by 
contrast to ‘Tat’. This is confirmed a contrario by the one instance of ‘Tat’ in GM I 13: ‘as though 
the weakness of the weak were itself (...) a voluntary achievement, something wanted, chosen, a 
deed [That], an accomplishment’ (Nietzsche’s italics). A Tat is an ‘accomplishment’ [Verdienst], 
the finished result of a process: in that spirit, Tat was the word chosen by Goethe to translate the 
beginning of Genesis (‘Im Amfang war die Tat’). It is almost certain that Nietzsche knew this, 
which makes his choice of ‘Thun’ more significant.  
 What rides on this translation issue? It allows a key idea to come to the fore, namely that the 
main characteristic of a ‘doing’ is not that it originates in an agent but that it is an ongoing process. 
                                                     
9 My thanks to Fabian Freyenhagen for his help with translations.  
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This is emphasised by the claim in GM I 13 that ‘es giebt keine “Sein” hinter dem Thun, Wirken, 
Werden’. Carol Diethe (CUP) translates this as ‘there is no “being” behind the deed, its effect and 
what becomes of it’. Yet this seems to take Thun in the sense of Tat, as a completed action which 
can then have effects or undergo further changes. It also introduces the idea of a progression from 
the deed to its effect and what becomes of it further down the line, as if Nietzsche was hinting at a 
narrative of what may happen to a deed after it has been completed. Kaufman gives a better 
translation as ‘there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming’. It is then natural to read 
‘Wirken’ and ‘Werden’ as appositions specifying the meaning of ‘Thun’. The thought seems to be 
that a ‘doing’ counts as such not because it is the operation of an agent (note the impersonal 
infinitive forms in German, and the equally impersonal gerundive in English), but because it 
produces effects and changes through time. So, a doing is best characterised as a process, the 
temporal unfolding of a (series of) change(s) unified by internal norms of development.10 
  Are we back to eliminativism then (after a somewhat tortuous detour through translation 
issues)? For, it would be tempting to conclude from the above picture that there are only ‘strength 
events’, as Pippin puts it. This, however, would be too hasty. To see why, let us return once more 
to the examples of lightning and strength/weakness. While both are processual, there is an 
important difference between the two. The unfolding of the process which leads to the flash of 
lightning only requires that certain atmospheric conditions should be met. By contrast, strength 
and weakness in Nietzsche’s sense here (not the tensile strength of steel or the weakness of clay) 
require participation from the individuals they develop in. This is because otherwise the 
‘smouldering of revenge and hatred’ in the weak would be analogous to the development of an 
undiagnosed and asymptomatic illness: it would happen at a sub-personal level and the weak 
would just be the passive site of the unfolding of a process they have no awareness of. As we shall 
see, this clashes with Nietzsche’s moral intuition that the weak are deceiving themselves. So, the 
thought conveyed by GM I 13 seems to be that doings are characterised by the fact that a process 
unfolds in the doer in such a way that s/he participates in it. But how should we understand such 
‘participation’? Is the doer active or passive? In which sense(s) is s/he a ‘doer’? In the spirit of 
Nietzsche’s keen awareness of the importance of grammatical structures for the way we think, I 
now turn briefly to the middle voice to seek help with these questions.   
 
TEACHINGS FROM THE GREEK MIDDLE VOICE: SELF-DECEPTION AS A MIDDLE-VOICED DOING IN GM I 
13. 
                                                     




 A good way to capture the type of engagement described by the middle voice is to start from 
the contrast with the active.11 In the active, Benvéniste tells us, the grammatical subject is external 
to the action: ‘[active] verbs denote a process which accomplishes itself from the subject and 
outside of him’ (1966: 172). For example, ‘πολέμον ποιεῖ’ (active) means ‘he makes war’ in the 
sense of making the war happen, for example by declaring it. Similarly, ‘κοιμᾶ’ (active) means he 
‘sleeps [someone]’, i.e. he puts someone to sleep. Or again, ‘γαμέο’ (active) means ‘I marry [you]’, 
where the (typically male) agent gets the process of marriage underway. In such cases, the use of 
the active presupposes that the grammatical subject should be understood as a separate agent 
whose function is to initiate a process. By contrast, in the middle voice the diathesis is internal: 
the use of the middle forms ‘indicates that something takes place in the person of the subject so as 
to affect him’ (Gonda 1960: 49). To return to the previous examples, ‘πολέμον ποιεῖται’ (middle) 
means ‘he is making war’, this time not by declaring it but by fighting the war. ‘Kοιμᾶται’ means 
‘he sleeps himself’ (he is sleeping). ‘Γαμέομαι’ is constructed with the dative, not the accusative, 
and is typically the form used by women, seen as less active than men. It is can be translated as ‘I 
am giving myself in marriage [to you]’ but as Gonda indicates, the meaning of the phrase is closer 
to something like ‘I respond to the process of marriage befalling me [in relation to you]’. 
 The contrast between the active and the middle voices is clear. In the active, the doer initiates 
a process (s/he is an agent in the etymological sense of the term). In the middle voice the process 
takes place in the doer, in such a way that she participates in it (she is ‘internal’ to the process). 
Consequently, middle-voiced forms typically involve a reciprocal relation between activity and 
passivity. This is most clear in what is called the ‘reflexive’ middle, in which the verb expresses an 
immediate self-relation. Whereas English requires a pronominal form to express a reflexive action 
such as ‘I wash myself’, ancient Greek only needs the middle ‘λούωμαι’. The use of the middle 
conveys that the process of washing takes place in the doer, in such a way that the doer can 
equally describe her involvement with it as active or passive: I am washing myself, and I am being 
washed (by myself). In her study of ‘Aristotle on Action’, Coope (2007) notes that even in the case 
of non-pronominal translations such as ‘I move’ the use of the middle voice suggests by itself that 
the doer is both active and passive. This can be brought out by considering the difference, not just 
between the middle and the active, but between the middle, active and passive. Κίνειν (active 
infinitive) means ‘to move/change’ (something else); κίνεσθαι (passive) means ‘to be 
                                                     
11 Contrary to what the name suggests, the middle voice is not between the active and the passive: 
historically, the original grammatical opposition was between the middle voice and the active. The passive 
evolved out of the middle and often has the same verbal forms.   
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moved/changed’; but κίνεσθαι (middle) means something like: ‘to undergo moving/changing’. The 
contrast between the passive and the middle suggests that it is possible to be moved without 
undergoing moving (if someone just lifts me and puts me somewhere else). By contrast, to undergo 
moving is to play an internal role in the moving in such a way that the latter can be described as 
active or passive: I move and I am moved (by myself).  
 What can we learn from this brief examination of the Greek middle voice? Firstly, it helps us 
to understand what it means for an agent to be the locus of the unfolding of a process. The process 
does not unfold in the agent like water is poured into a glass, or like an unknown illness grows 
inside us. The doer participates in the sense that she is aware that the process is unfolding, is 
affected by it and affects it in return. Secondly, what matters primarily to understand a middle-
voiced doing is the perspective of the process itself: whether I wash myself or am being washed by 
myself is of less importance than the fact that the process of washing is unfolding in me, with my 
participation. From this perspective, the right question is not: ‘is this a doing or a happening?’, as 
in contemporary theories of agency, but rather something like: ‘what is the process unfolding in 
the doer, and what is her engagement with it?’. Call this the ‘middle-voiced question’. If I am right 
to think that GM I 13 invites us to think of at least some ‘doings’ as middle-voiced, then one 
would expect the middle-voiced question, and the above considerations on activity and passivity, 
to help us make sense of the text. I shall now argue that they do, and that this allows us to read 
GM I 13 in a different light, as drawing attention not so much to the creation of new values by the 
weak as to the specific manner in which such values were created: self-deception as a middle-
voiced doing.  
 So, what is the relevant process? Nietzsche tells us that is the ‘smouldering of hatred and 
revenge’ in the weak. The rest of the passage implicitly answers the second part of the middle-
voiced question by explaining what the engagement of the weak with the process consists in. The 
narrative presupposes what is described in the first few sentences of GM I 13, namely the belief 
that every event is a doing and that there is a doer ‘behind’ every deed. Given that Nietzsche’s 
explanation for the formation of this belief is ‘the seduction of language’, and that most of (if not 
all) the time we are unaware of the ways in which grammatical structures shape our ways of 
thinking, it is plausible to think that this part of the story is sub-personal: the weak may not be 
aware that they hold this belief. Correlatively the belief in the agent as an initiator of action, albeit 
incorrect because it results from a grammatical falsification, is not a moral belief. However, things 
change when ‘the entrenched, secretly smouldering emotions of revenge and hatred put this belief 
to their own use’. They do this by turning the belief into a different, but related, belief, which 
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‘they [hatred and revenge] defend passionately’: ‘the strong are free to be weak, and the birds of 
prey are free to be lambs’. At this point, the weak enter the scene and hold a speech. They ‘say to 
each other with the vindictive cunning of powerlessness: “let us be different from evil people, let 
us be good! (...) And a good person is (...) like us who are patient, humble and upright”’. The weak 
build on this new moral belief by inferring from it that they would be free to behave like the 
strong and that their ‘restraint’ is ‘something wanted, chosen’, a matter of ‘patient virtue’ rather 
than necessity.  
 It is the first time in the narrative of GM I 13 that the weak are shown to be doing anything. 
So, what is it that they do? From their perspective, the holding of the speech looks like an action 
in the broadly Humean sense outlined above. They form intentions (proximally: to speak, and 
more distally: to ‘construe their mode of existence as a particular accomplishment’) and carry 
these out by holding their speech. But recall that this speech is framed by the smouldering of 
revenge and hatred unfolding in the weak. From this perspective things look different: the weak 
now seem passive conduits for the smouldering of hatred and revenge, which ‘put the belief to 
their own use’. The speech of the weak looks like an instance of what Katsafanas calls ‘mere 
behaviour’, something which has the form of activity but in fact is the result of forces at work 
deep in the agent. From being agents of their speech, the weak have turned into patients.  
 Yet for the weak to be passive in this way, the smouldering of hatred and revenge would have 
to unfold in a sub-personal manner, on the model of the illness previously evoked. But this is not 
how GM I 13 presents the situation: the speech of the weak is said to be an instance of the 
‘counterfeiting and self-deception of powerlessness’ (see also GM I 10, where ‘men of ressentiment 
(...) lie themselves into happiness’). This emphasis on mendacity suggests, firstly, that the virtues 
extolled as having intrinsic authority by the speech (such as patience, humility and uprightness) 
have instrumental value only: they allow the ‘lambs’ the satisfaction of revenge against the ‘birds 
of prey’. Secondly, it indicates that the speech does not express a commitment to truth but the 
‘need to believe in an unbiased “subject” with freedom of choice’ (ibidem). On this picture, the 
weak have a background awareness that their speech is motivated by revenge and hatred: yet they  
‘sanctify every lie’ out of their ‘instinct of self-preservation and [reactive] self-affirmation’. 
Accordingly, GM I 13 concludes that the reason the subject (...) has been until now the best 
doctrine on earth, is perhaps because it facilitated that sublime self-deception whereby the (...) 
weak of every kind could construe weakness itself as freedom’. So, what the weak are doing in 
holding their speech is deceiving themselves.  
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 One may object that the fact that the weak are self-deceived does not mean that they are 
doing the deceiving: the self-deception could be sub-personal, and so not a doing at all. In 
Wallace’s terms, the weak ‘need not be aware, at any level, that the adoption of new values will 
bring about the [desired] effect’ (Wallace 2007: 12n). In that case, then, the relevant values would 
be genuinely internalised. Textually, however, the fact that the speech of the weak is presented as 
an example of the ‘cleverness of the lower rank’ (my italics) and a ‘counterfeiting’ (also in GM III 
14) strongly suggests that the self-deception is intentional. Further, the absence of true 
internalisation of the relevant values is typically marked by a discrepancy between the beliefs 
professed by a person on the one hand, and her comportment on the other. GM I 13 portrays the 
weak as exhibiting just this discrepancy. The manner in which they hold their speech is not 
‘patient and humble’: they speak to each other with the ‘vindictive cunning of powerlessness’. 
They extol their own merits (‘like us who are patient, humble and upright’) in a way which is 
anything but humble (or upright).12 This practical dissonance indicates that the weak are ‘in some 
sense both aware and motivatedly not aware of their efficacious motives’ (Poellner (2015): 199; 
also 203-210). Their motives are in principle available to them, but they have a pre-reflective 
intention to avoid self-knowledge: in Nietzsche’s terms, they show ‘mendacity to avoid admitting 
this hatred as hatred’ (GM III 14).  
 So, Nietzsche’s answer in GM I 13 to the second part of the middle-voiced question (what is 
the doer’s engagement with the relevant process?) is something like: the weak engage with the 
unfolding of revenge and hatred within them by deceiving themselves into extolling the values 
that allow them to believe that their weakness is an accomplishment. In typical middle-voiced 
fashion (perhaps not so surprising given that self-deception has a reflexive structure), the weak are 
both active and passive: they deceive themselves because they intentionally avoid their pre-
reflective awareness of their own motives becoming first personal, but they are also deceived in 
the sense that they are taken in by their own propaganda. Importantly, the possibility and 
coherence of such self-deception rests on the existence of an intermediary level between, on the 
one hand, unconscious contents which operate at a sub-personal level and do not come to 
awareness and, on the other hand, conceptually articulated, reflectively conscious perceptual 
contents or intentions. This level, which the phenomenological tradition calls ‘pre-reflective’, 
                                                     
12 See also GM I 14: ‘they speak of love, and they sweat’.  
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characterises contents which are phenomenally conscious, and so in principle available to 
conscious awareness, but which are not the focus of attention and so remain non-articulated.13  
 It would be wrong, however, to infer from GM I 13 that all middle-voiced doings are 
instances of self-deception. I now turn to instances of middle-voiced doings in Nietzsche’s own 
experience, with a view to bringing out their phenomenology. I propose that such 
phenomenology involves three key features: (pre-)reflective awareness of being engaged in a 
process, responsiveness and absence of reflective control.  
 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIDDLE-VOICED DOINGS. 
 
ΕΗ, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, §3 - (...) The idea of revelation in the sense of something 
suddenly becoming visible and audible with unspeakable assurance and subtlety, something 
that throws you down and leaves you deeply shaken this simply describes the facts of the 
case. You listen, you do not look for anything, you take, you do not ask who is there; a 
thought lights up in a flash, with necessity, without hesitation as to its form, - I never had any 
choice. A delight whose incredible tension sometimes triggers a burst of tears, sometimes 
automatically hurries your pace and sometimes slows it down; a perfect state of being outside 
yourself, with the most distinct consciousness of a host of subtle shudders and shiverings 
down to the tips of your toes; a profound joy where the bleakest and most painful things do 
not have the character of opposites, but instead act as its conditions, as welcome components, 
as necessary shades within this sort of excess of light; an instinct for rhythmic relations that 
spans wide expanses of forms the length, the need for a rhythm that spans wide distances is 
almost the measure of the force of inspiration, something to balance out its pressure and 
tension… (p. 126, Nietzsche’s italics) 
 
 Recall the middle-voiced question: ‘what is the process unfolding in the doer, and what is her 
engagement with it?’. The answer to the first part of the question is: ‘revelation’ becoming ‘visible 
and audible’. Nietzsche’s engagement with the process begins with his becoming aware of the 
process: something suddenly becomes ‘visible and audible (...), something that throws you down 
and leaves you deeply shaken’. This coming to awareness of himself as a ‘medium’ (ibidem) is 
traumatic. It is also first personal and conscious (Nietzsche knows that he is ‘deeply shaken’).  
Nietzsche’s engagement with the process unfolds in a set of pre-reflective responses which are 
initially presented in the second person, presumably as a rhetorical device to involve the reader 
directly. Firstly, ‘you listen’: the process of revelation makes something ‘audible’ for the first time. 
                                                     
13 There are many examples of such pre-reflective contents in Husserl or Sartre. We can be attracted by a 
person without having an articulated awareness of the fact that we are so inclined, nor of the reasons why. 
Similarly, as Poellner puts it, we can ‘be actively aiming to bring about a certain state of affairs (as opposed 
to merely wishing for it or imagining it) without [our] intention-in-action being conceptually represented 
by [us] at the time of being engaged in the relevant physical or mental actions’ (2015: 204).  
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But being audible is not the same thing as being listened to. Hearing is passive, the registering of 
sound waves on the inner ear. It is not within our control: we can’t help hearing a noise if the 
relevant stimulus is ongoing, but we can fail to listen to it. Listening requires us to focus our 
attention on the relevant sensory content. This makes the listener less sensitive to other 
solicitations, in particular self-centred ones such as the possible discomfort or fearsome character 
of the experience of revelation. So, the listener is ‘outside himself’ in the sense that he is focused 
away from himself by the experience of listening, attuned to the external solicitations which the 
experience presents.  
 Secondly, ‘you do not look for anything, you take’. While ‘taking’ seems the paradigm of an 
action starting from the agent, the context suggests that in this case taking could equally be 
described as a being given: ‘everything offers itself up as the closest, simplest, most fitting 
expression’. In typical middle-voiced reversibility between active and passive, taking is receiving, 
which is why there is no need to ‘look for anything’: it is already there. Thirdly, ‘a thought lights 
up in a flash’ (yet another flash!): one may be tempted to view the individual as the passive site of 
such flashing. In the context of EH3, however, the ‘lighting up’ of the thought is more plausibly 
understood as enabled by the listener’s attentiveness.  
 At this point Nietzsche speaks in the first person for the first time (to powerful rhetorical 
effect) and avows the experience as his: ‘I never had any choice’. Again, the temptation is to read 
this in an eliminativist manner, as indicating that Nietzsche is just a passive vessel for revelation. 
But on a middle-voiced conception of agency, the idea that the doer ‘never had any choice’ is not 
an argument against their being a doer because the doing was never a question of choice in the 
first place (insofar as choice typically starts from the agent, involving the representation of 
possible options and the carrying out of an intention to pursue one of these). So, the observation 
that ‘I never had any choice’ is best read, not as an indicator of passivity, but as the recognition of 
the middle-voiced character of the doing as a response to finding oneself already engaged with 
revelation as a process. This is confirmed by the end of the passage, which states that ‘all of this is 
involuntary to the highest degree but takes place as if in a storm of feelings of freedom, of 
unrestricted activity, of power, of divinity’. Finally, note that while Nietzsche is aware of the 
process, he does not have (nor seeks) reflective control over it (‘all of this is involuntary to the 
highest degree’): his engagement is pre-reflective, a matter of attunement to the process unfolding 
in him. 
 Thus EH 3 presents a powerful evocation of a middle-voiced doing as finding oneself the 
‘medium’ of revelation and responding non-reflectively, through attentiveness. The next passage is 
 17 
 
different because this time the response is, at least in part, reflective: it takes the form of an 
‘experiment’. The relevant process is ‘distress philosophising in the sick thinker’.14 That the sick 
thinker has reflective awareness of being the medium of this process is taken for granted, since he 
responds with a deliberate experiment: 
 
Here an experiment is possible. Just like a traveller who resolves to wake up at a certain hour 
and then calmly gives himself up to sleep, so too we philosophers, should we become ill, 
temporarily surrender with body and soul to the illness - we shut our eyes to ourselves, as it 
were. And as the traveller knows that something is not asleep, something that will count the 
hours and wake him up, we, too, know that the decisive moment will find us awake, that 
something will then leap forward and catch the mind in the act, i.e. in its weakness or 
repentance or hardening or gloom, and whatever else the pathological states of the mind are 
called that on healthy days are opposed by the pride of the mind (for the old saying still holds: 
'the proud mind, the peacock, and the horse are the three proudest animals on earth).  
GS, p.5. (Nietzsche’s italics) 
 
The sick thinker’s response relies on the formation of two reflective intentions: to perform the 
experiment itself, and to ‘surrender with body and soul to the illness’. This is illustrated by a 
metaphor, to ‘shut our eyes to ourselves’.15 This is different from going to sleep (if sleep is taken to 
be a sub-personal state): shutting our eyes to ourselves means not to focus our attention on 
ourselves so that something else acquires the possibility to register on the ‘surface’ of 
consciousness (EH: 97). The experiment consists in seeking an intermediary, pre-reflective state in 
which self-awareness is peripheral only. So, shutting one’s eyes to oneself is the same as listening, 
but taken in reverse: listening is a focusing of attention on a determinate content which turns 
attention away from the self. Shutting our eyes to ourselves is a turning of attention away from 
the self, intended to allow something yet indeterminate to appear.   
 This is illustrated by the analogy with sleep. A traveller who goes to sleep ‘knows that 
something is not asleep, something that will count the hours and wake him up’. Presumably, this 
‘something’ counts the hours because the traveller has formed, prior to going to sleep, the 
intention of waking up at a certain time. What makes this case different from a straightforward 
case of agency as the forming and carrying out of intentions is that the sleeping agent does not 
                                                     
14 Although the passage is written in the third person, given the decisive influence Nietzsche attributed to 
illness when reflecting on his own philosophising there is little doubt that the excerpt can be taken to apply 
to him.   
15 Interestingly, Nietzsche describes self-deception by using a very similar metaphor in the Antichrist: it is a 
‘closing of one’s eyes to oneself’ (46). On my reading both are middle-voiced doings; yet whereas self-
deception is a way of blinding oneself to one’s true commitments, the shutting of one’s eyes in GS: 5 has the 
opposite function. It allows epistemic access to certain truths about the self (in this case, that it 
pathologically gives in to weakness or repentance) which would otherwise remain inaccessible.  
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have reflective control over the process. The case of the sick philosopher is both similar and 
dissimilar (which is why sleep is an analogy only). It is similar because just as sleep allows the 
intention to wake up to run in the background and manifest itself at the right time, in the same 
way the focusing of attention away from the self (the shutting our eyes to ourselves) allows 
‘something’ to ‘leap forward and catch the mind in the act, i.e. weakness or repentance or 
hardening or gloom’. This ‘something’ is not specified directly but the next sentence identifies the 
‘pride of the mind’ (Nietzsche’s italics in both cases), as what ‘on healthy days’ opposes the 
‘pathological states of the mind’. If one considers ‘weakness, repentance, hardening or gloom’ as 
examples of such pathological states, then plausibly what catches the mind ‘in the act’ is the 
proud, healthy part of the mind that the focusing of conscious attention away from the sick self 
has allowed to emerge.16  
 There are two key differences with the case of sleep. The first is the much greater 
indeterminacy of the process. The traveller forms a determinate intention (to wake himself up at X 
hour) and the outcome of the process is accordingly predictable, although not guaranteed. The 
sick philosopher, however, only forms the vague intention to focus away from his sick self – an 
intention which may be difficult to carry out in the first place because it draws attention (a 
contrario) to the sick self, and so may seem self-defeating. Since the intention is largely 
indeterminate (in particular as regards what would count as the appropriate means), what its 
carrying out will allow to manifest itself, and the form taken by such manifestation, are equally 
indeterminate. Contrary to the traveller, who expects to wake up at a time he has chosen himself, 
the sick philosopher cannot know in advance in which act his sick mind will be caught, nor when, 
nor how. It is not even clear that he can know in advance what exactly will happen (remember 
that Nietzsche recounts the experience retrospectively, in the light of his posterior knowledge). 
All the sick philosopher can do is set in place the conditions under which something will happen, 
in a middle-voiced manner. Insofar as he turns attention away from himself, he is active. Insofar as 
his mind is ‘caught in the act’, he is passive. As with the sleeper, there is no reflective control over 
the process.  
 Thus EH 3 and GS 5 present us with two different cases of middle-voiced doings.17 The 
common points are that in both cases the doer becomes aware that he is engaged with a process 
(revelation becoming audible, illness philosophising in oneself) which he has not initiated, and 
                                                     
16 Note in this respect the middle-voiced formulation: the sick thinker neither awakens nor is awakened but 
is ‘found awake’ by the ‘decisive moment’.   
17 Further examples of middle-voiced doings include the well-known EH 9 p. 97 and EH 4 p. 118.  
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responds to this process in ways which can be described both as active and passive. His responses 
can be pre-reflective (as in the case of revelation) or reflective (as in the case of the experiment 
and the shutting of one’s eyes on oneself). However, even when the response is reflective its aim is 
to generate a state of pre-reflectiveness in which an up-to-then unknown part of the self can 
become manifest, in ways which are very hard to foresee. In neither case does the doer have 
reflective control.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that we should consider the meaning of the word ‘Thun’, and its relation to the 
other process verbs in GM I 13, more carefully: the ‘doing’, not the deed, is everything. In the case 
of middle-voiced doings, the doer is both passive in that she finds herself already engaged in a 
process, and active in that she responds to it. There is no doer ‘behind’ the doing because it is the 
doer’s (pre-) reflective awareness of being engaged with an internal process which constitutes her 
as a doer. The doer finds herself in the doing, both in the sense of discovering herself in medias res 
and of becoming the doer she is through her response to the process unfolding in her.  
 From this perspective, the claim that the ‘doing is everything’ serves to displace the dominant 
opposition between deeds and events, agents and patients. As we saw, the most relevant question 
to think of middle-voiced doings is not ‘is this a doing or a happening?’ but rather ‘what is the 
process unfolding in the doer, and what is her engagement with it?’. I have argued that using this 
question as a lens to read GM I 13 puts the excerpt in a new light, as presenting us, not only with a 
criticism of common morality, but with a key example of a middle-voiced doing: self-deception. 
Finally, I have looked at two other instances of middle-voiced doings in Nietzsche’s work and 
brought out three features of their first-person phenomenology: pre-reflective awareness of being 
engaged with a process, responsiveness and absence of reflective control.  
 There would be much more to say about middle-voiced doings but for now I wish to 
emphasise two points. The first is that for Nietzsche not all doings are middle-voiced. It is only 
when doers find themselves engaged with an internal process and respond to it that they are 
acting in a middle-voiced way. Much of what we do can more immediately be understood from 
the perspective of the agent, as the carrying out of prior (or expressive) intentions. It is also 
possible for an individual to start with a prior intention and then to engage in a middle-voided 
manner with the process that her intention has started (as in the case of the ‘experiment’): perhaps 
the experience of writing may itself be understood in this way. We start the process of writing 
intentionally but once we find ourselves in it we comport ourselves in a middle voice manner, by 
 20 
 
responding to what we write as it unfolds: we are both affected by the process and affect it in 
return. At any rate, middle-voiced doings are only a part, albeit arguably an important part, of 
what we do.  
 However, the thought that it is best to start from the agent’s intentions to understand agency 
has become so dominant that it is very easy to overlook the existence of middle-voiced doings, 
with their reliance on the doer’s awareness of a process unfolding in her and their trademark 
combination of activity and passivity. If I am right to think that some of Nietzsche’s work can be 
read as drawing attention to the middle-voiced aspects of life, then perhaps this may serve as a 
prophylactic against the dominance of the agent (and of the active voice) in understanding all 
exercises of agency.  
 Secondly, Nietzsche clearly attaches a positive value to at least some middle-voiced doings. 
The case of self-deception is ambivalent: if GM is right it has been the cause of much harm in 
human history. Yet Nietzsche also sees self-deception as protecting us from truths which would 
make it hard for us to carry on living. But Nietzsche unequivocally values the middle-voiced 
doings described in EH §3 and GS 5. The thought seems to be that in each case, the middle-voiced 
character of the doing allowed him to achieve what he could not have done through a more 
straightforward exercise of agency (show appropriate receptiveness to revelation, having his mind 
caught ‘in the act’ of giving in to pathological states), and that there is genuine worth in being able 
to do this. So, there definitely is a place for middle-voiced doings in our ethical life. In previous 
work (Han-Pile 2009; 2017) I started exploring this place in relation to two of Nietzsche’s main 
ethical ideals, amor fati and the affirmation of life. Further exploration will be work for another 
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